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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional notions and rules of professionalism in the legal profession have been premised on particular conceptions of the lawyer’s role,
usually as an advocate,1 occasionally as a counselor, advisor, transaction
planner, government official, decision maker and in the recent parlance
of one of this symposium’s participants—a “statesman [sic].”2 As we examine what professionalism means and what rules should be used to
regulate its activity, it is important to ask some foundational questions:
For what ends should our profession be used? What does law offer society? How should lawyers exercise their particular skills and competencies?
While it is true that the lawyer is an advocate and uses her skills to
persuade others on behalf of her client—her principal—lawyers are also
“officers of the court” with loyalties and allegiances to the public good,
and sometimes, its agencies. As others have elaborated, lawyers have
duties to practice justice.3 And, we have heard much in this symposium,
as well as in modern professional discourse, about the tensions between
the paradigms of “law as a profession” and “law as a business.”4
I want to suggest, as I have before,5 that lawyers serve other functions
as well and that our rules of professionalism do not adequately reflect
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center and Chair, CPR-Institute for
Dispute Resolution-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR. Thanks to Professor Jeff Stempel for the invitation to return to Florida State University College of Law and to
the other symposium participants for stimulating thoughts and comments.
1. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No
Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers’ Responsibilities, 38 S. T EX. L. R EV. 407
(1997) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolu tion]; Carrie MenkelMeadow, The Silences of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers : Lawyering as Only
Adversary Practice, 10 GEO. J. L EGAL ETHICS 631 (1997) [herein after Menkel Meadow, Silences
of the Restatement].
2. ANTHONY KRONMAN , THE LOST LAWYER (1994).
3. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND J USTICE : AN ETHICAL STUDY xvii, xxii (1988); see also
W ILLIAM SIMON, THE P RACTICE OF J USTICE : A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 12 (1998) (suggesting
that ethical rules are one way to “alleviate the moral anxiety” of lawyers).
4. See Russell G. Pearce, Law Day 2050: Post-Professionalism, Moral Leadership, and
the Law-As-Business Paradigm, 27 F LA. S T . U. L. R EV. 9 (1999) [hereinafter Pearce, Law Day
2050]. The profession-business tension has been with us since at least the early 18th ce n tury,
though some would claim the rhetoric about different masters as justice or manna has been
with us since the beginning of American legal hi story. See LAWRENCE F RIEDMAN, A H ISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW (1985).
5. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem Solving Pedagogy Seriously, 49 J.
LEGAL EDUC . 14 (1999); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, To Solve Problems, Not Make Them: In tegrating ADR in the Law School Curriculum, 46 SMU L. REV. 1995 (1993); Carrie Men kel-
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some of these other functions—the lawyer as pro blem solver,6 peacemaker7 and third party neutral, as some examples. Too much of the debate about professionalism, it seems to me, has been clustered around a
series of false dichotomies or polarizations—business versus profession,
client defense (zeal) versus truth, adversarialism versus compromise,
criminal versus civil, public versus private, client service and autonomy
vs. justice, individualism vs. system, rules of law and discretion—as if
our actual practices do not often combine aspects of these claimed opposites simultaneously.
Law is a profession and clearly is concerned with, and suffering from,
market competition and other economic influences. Lawyers simultaneously serve their clients and have duties and obligations to the profession itself and to the larger society and its public agencies. Lawyers often
serve clients in adversarial settings like litigation or contested transa ctional negotiations, but they also serve clients in non-adversarial roles
where there is no adversary at all (will drafting, business advice) or even
serve people as lawyers without having them in formal client relationships (serving on boards of directors, acting as mediators, facilitators or
consensus builders).8 There are no easy stopping points along many of
these continua.
To the extent that lawyers and legal academics have an obligation to
diagnose, solve and reform legal issues, it seems imperative that we take
account of the complexity of lawyer roles and not use simple “paradigms” to obscure more functional complexity. As a former practicing
lawyer and a long-time ethics teacher, I have questioned the desirability
of transsubstantivity in both ethical and procedural rules,9 when fun ctional specificity may be required for more clarity of role, guidance necessary for professional actors and clearer stat ements of purpose for the
consumer of such services. Though professions often desire general rules
of ethics to unify and mark the boundaries of what a profession is, increasingly, general ethics and professionalism may be so general and abstract as to be of little use both to those who need to act as professionals,
with guidance from appropriate rules and standards, and to those who
need to judge the actions of professionals—both consumers and regulators of various kinds.10 To the extent that we too narrowly define the
Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31
UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View ].
6. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Art and Science of Problem-Solving Negotiation,
TRIAL, June, 1999 at 48; Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View , supra note 5.
7. It was Abraham Lincoln, that consummate advocate, who exhorted his profession to:
“discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out to
them how the nominal winner is often a real loser—in fees, expenses, and waste of time. As a
peacemaker, the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man. There will still be
business enough [sic].” Abraham Lincoln, Fragment: Notes for a Law Lecture, in THE
COLLECTIVE W ORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN : SUPPLEMENT 1832-1865, 18-19 (Roy B asler ed.,
1974). In the original speech he said “never encourage” rather than “discourage” litigation.
8. See CONSENSUS BUILDING H ANDBOOK (Larry Susskind ed., 1999).
9. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the
Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. R EV. 1159 (1995); see also Eleanor Myers, “ Simple Truths”
About Moral Education, 45 AM . U. L. R EV. 823 (1996).
10. In general, regulation of professionals has itself become more complex, including, for
the legal profession, disciplinary bodies in the states, court decisions through disqualification,
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frame or prism through which we define lawyers’ roles, we may be providing inadequate ethical guidance for lawyers and too narrowly crafting
what services lawyers can provide.11 In short, this is an argument for
functional ethics, recognizing a broader set of functions for the lawyer in
some non-adversarial settings than current conceptions of ethics or
professionalism seem to want to recognize.
For some, lawyers are the servants of a system that utilizes “the rule
of law” to restrain what might be the despotic or corrupt rule of partic ular individuals. Lawyers are thus agents of a particular system that has
its own justification. David Luban, for example, has examined whether
the lawyer’s activities as an advocate in an adversary system can be justified by the defense of the larger system in which the lawyer is located—the adversary system. 12 Others have framed the lawyer’s role in
different ways: the “transaction cost engineer,”13 the “process architect,”14 the purveyor of justice or officer of the court15 with “referential”
ethical responsibility placed in the “reputational” market (for transactional work) or a jurisprudential or legalistic definition of “systemic”
justice (for litigation). To the extent that lawyers serve different functions, with their particular expertise located in different process functions, it may be that ethics will have to be specifically related to function
and form of the activity within specific and, perhaps, different instit utional settings.16
In a recent book examining adversarial ethics (and finding them
wanting), Arthur Isak Applbaum acknowledges the ethics of professional
function (and suggests these can go too far) by recounting the ability of
Charles-Henri Sanson in maintaining his position as Executioner of

sanction and withdrawal motions, federal agencies with their own rules of admission and practice (IRS and SEC, as examples), and increasingly, the transdisciplinary actions of professional
associations that either certify or hope to regulate best practices in some professional fields,
such as mediation or paralegals. See, e.g., AAA/ABA/SPIDR, MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
FOR MEDIATORS (1995); L. Ray Patterson, LAWYER’ S LAW: P ROCEDURAL , M ALPRACTICE AND
DISCIPLINARY ISSUES (4th ed. 1999).
11. In this essay I am principally concerned with lawyers’ roles in dispute resolution and
what I call “transactional ADR,” but there are many other related issues of other functions to be
performed by lawyers currently being addressed by the ABA Commission on Multi-Disciplinary
Practice.
See
Report
(visited
June
9,
1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpreport.html> (suggesting Model Rule revisions to permit,
with certain rules and regulations, multi-disciplinary practice of lawyers with nonlawyers and
allowing fee-splitting with other non-legal professionals; see also Ritchenya Shepard, Lawyers,
Accountants and Beyond, NAT’L L.J. , June 21, 1999, at A-1.
12. See David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse , in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’
R OLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS (David Luban ed., 1984).
13. Ronald Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pri cing ,
94 YALE L. J. 239, 244 (1984).
14. R OBERT MNOOKIN, BEYOND W INNING: H OW LAWYERS H ELP CLIENTS CREATE VALUE IN
NEGOTIATION (forthcoming).
15. See SIMON, supra note 3, at 9.
16. I have often thought of Lon Fuller as the “jurisprude” of ADR. His series of articles
discusses the particular structures and competencies of adjudication, arbitration and mediation
as different legal processes. In the debates about ADR, the 1950s Legal Process school’s insights
about “institutional competence” continue, suggesting that different forms and institutions
within the legal system may also require different ethical systems. See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 1, at 415-21, 417 n.41; see also David Luban, R ediscovering Fuller’s Legal Ethics, 11 GEO. J. L EGAL ETHICS 801, 807 (1998).

156

FL O R ID A S T AT E U N I V E RSI T Y LA W RE V IE W

[Vol. 27:153

Paris through changes in regime from Louis XVI through all the stages of
the French Revolution, because of his extreme professional and functional ethics17—he was simply a professional ex ecutioner and the underlying political regime for whom he did his work did not matter. 18 What
did matter was how and with what professional standards of quality he
performed his work. I want to su ggest the danger of Sanson’s success—the assumption in our own code of legal ethics, that a lawyer is a
lawyer and that all lawyers can be regulated, by the same rules, regardless of how or for whom they perform their services.
Though the analogy is not totally apt, Sanson’s ethics as an Executioner transcending political regime is a bit like the expectation of our
current ethical codes—that a lawyer can be governed by a unitary code as
long as he is called a “lawyer,” regardless of whether his “political regime” is the adversarial world of advocacy or not. Some have suggested
that we can avoid these problems by claiming that a lawyer who performs non-adversarial roles, like arbitrator-judge or mediator, is simply
not acting as a lawyer. 19 However, I have argued otherwise, suggesting
that such roles do implicate the use of law and its “practice” in the reliance third parties may place on legal interpretations, even if they are not
clients.20
Though the adversary system is both defended and found wanting for
its claim that it is the best method for learning the truth,21 or, alternatively, for protecting individual rights, 22 or, because when compared with
various alternatives, it is considered the fairest by participants,23 other
forms of legal and non-legal problem solving are growing in importance
because they emphasize other values. A recent reform effort in the
United Kingdom, for example, has borrowed aspects of the continental
inquisitorial system by using single, court-appointed experts to reduce
17. See ARTHUR I SAK APPLBAUM , ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES : THE MORALITY OF R OLES IN
P UBLIC AND P ROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999).
18. This extreme form of “functional” professional ethics is also examined in Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel, R EMAINS OF THE DAY (1989). See Rob Atkinson, How the Butler was Made to Do
It: The Perverted Professionalism of the Remains of the Day , 105 YALE L.J. 177 (1995); see also
David Luban, Stevens’s Professionalism and Ours , 38 W M . & MARY L. R EV. 297 (1996).
19. See Symposium, Is Mediation the Practice of Law?, NIDR F ORUM , June 1997; see also
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. When ADR Is Ancillary to a Legal Practice, Law Firms Must Confront
Conflicts Issues, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 147 (1994); Bruce Meyerson, Lawyers
Who Mediate Are Not Practicing Law, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 74 (1996); Geetha
Ravindra, When Mediation Becomes the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIG. 94 (1997); N.J. Panel Finds ADR Is Part of Law Pra ctice , 12 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIG . 87 (1994).
20. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice of Law?, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIG. 57 (1996); see also To the Editors: Is Mediation the Practice of Law Redux ,
NIDR NEWS , Nov. 1997-Jan. 1998, at 1 (1998).
21. See LUBAN, supra note 3, at 68-74; see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL , P ARTISAN J USTICE
(1980); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
Multicultural World, 38 W M . & MARY L. R EV. 5, 5-6 (1996) (providing a critique of the adversary system and its binary nature) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Trou ble].
22. See Monroe Freedman, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER’S ETHICS 16 (1990); Monroe Freed man, The Trouble with Postmodern Zeal, 38 W M . & MARY L. R EV. 63 (1996).
23. See J OHN THIBAUT & LAURENS W ALKER, P ROCEDURAL J USTICE : A P SYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1975); see also John Thibaut et al., Adversary Presentation and Bias in Decision making, 86 H ARV. L. REV. 386, 386-88 (1972) (discussing research that appears to su p port the
validity of an adversarial model).
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adversarialism among competing and “bought” experts and is suggesting
court-structured fee schedules (borrowed from Germany) to add predictability and, presumably, access to legal services. 24
As Bill Simon recently demonstrated so eloquently, even the ethics of
the adversary system are self-contradictory, or, in the old words of critical legal studies, “indeterminate” because the guiding ethical concepts of
the “zealous advocate” limited by the “bounds of the law” are often either
in tension with each other or have no clear lines of demarcation.25 Furthermore, as Simon and others have argued, in our current legal culture,
the “zeal” of the advocate for his client has trumped whatever “suppl ementary” values are intended to be e xpressed in the duties of the “officer
of the court” who has responsibilities to the larger system of justice.26
Even the notion of “officer of the court” as an ethical counterpoint to
consider the justice or fairness of one’s acts as a zealous advocate falls
far short of today’s law practice realities. If taken literally, the lawyer’s
duty to be an officer “of the court,” intending to connote some loyalty to
the system, beyond the client’s demands, would seem to apply to those
matters in litigation, or at least those in anticipation of litigation.27 How
should the lawyer’s duty to the system be expressed for non-court lawyer
activities—the lawyer as counselor, will drafter, negotiator, or, in the
major role which is my theme here, as third party neutral?28 The lawyer
is not always an officer of the court when performing legal tasks; thus,
the reference point for professionalism and ethics must be something
beyond the lawyer’s duty to a tribunal or specific office, whether located
in a specific institution or within the more generalized institution of litigation.
I have written at length elsewhere that the adversarial system, though
serving some functions, is potentially deficient in meeting some human
goals.29 To the extent that the structure of adversarialism privileges a rgument, debate, bipolar or binary solutions and often channels disputes
or issues into simplistic two-sided treatment, this stylized form prevents
recognition of the more common ways in which legal problems occur in
our modern world. Even conventional lawsuits these days are often dis24. See Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report, R EPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON
CIVIL J USTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND W ALES (July 1996).
25. See SIMON, supra note 3, at 7-8.
26. See id. at 9-10 (arguing for a discretionary approach to lawyering that considers a wide
range of circumstances “to promote justice”).
27. For those cases that are actually filed, we know that over 90% are resolved with out
trial in court. This does not mean, as many continue to suggest, that 90% of cases settle. Many,
in fact, are resolved by judicial decision or other means (motions for summary judgment, etc.).
See Herbert Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray , 70 J UDICATURE 161, 161
(1986). Of course, “officer of the court” also implicates the complex ethical dispute about when
lawyers as advisors (particularly in regulatory advice giving) are acting on the basis of “anticipation” of litigation, as became an issue in the Lincoln Savings and Loan disciplinary charges.
See Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, The Kaye Scholer File, in R EGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS 729, 731 (1992).
28. I have continually raised the issue of whether a lawyer appearing in a private mediation, arbitration, or in a court-annexed program is appearing before a “tribunal” as defined in
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, or, now, in the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers. See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 1; see also
Menkel-Meadow, Silences of the Restatement, supra note 1.
29. See Menkel-Meadow, Trouble, supra note 21.
THE
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putes or issues between and among multiple parties (i.e. environmental
clean-ups, mass torts, securities, reform of governmental entities, consumer actions), often with multiple issues at stake—what Lon Fuller
called “multi-plex” disputes, which are not susceptible to litigious on/off,
yes/no solutions.30 These kinds of cases may require complex solutions,
with future-oriented rules, transactions or duties and cannot adequately
be served by the “limited remedial imaginations” of courts.31
Some lawyers represent entities, either from within or without, and
must manage internal organizational or “constituency” problems32 as a
matter of advice and counsel, whether or not there are particular legal
disputes with the outside world. Modern in-house counsel or ombudsman-like lawyers may deal as much with internal organizational issues
and management than with outside disputes, calling for very different
skills and approaches to legal problem solving.33 Other lawyers are e ngaged to help individuals or entities form organizations or partnerships,
draft wills or contracts, and may or may not have “issues” or “adversaries” in the way the adversarial model of lawyering understands them.
If finding the truth, learning what happened in the past, and protecting individual rights are not the only values a legal system should express, then perhaps we need to recast the goals that lawyers and the legal
system might seek to achieve. Furthermore, we might need to rethink
the rules that are intended to guide and regulate lawyers seeking to
achieve those different goals. What if, for example, we saw lawyers and
the legal system seeking to solve not only client problems, but also
seeking to work on community-based or even larger social problems?
What if needs, as well as rights, were part of the lawyer’s vocabulary?
Notions of loyalty would be different. So, would there need to be different rules regarding confidentiality? If, as in other cultures, we began to
value harmony34 and peace, as much as contention and rights, lawyers
seeking to reduce, rather than increase, conflict might have to operate in
different ways.
If, as I suggested some years ago, and which is now becoming a more
popular notion with many, including the Attorney General,35 we considered the lawyer as problem-solver, then lawyers would engage in forward-thinking, planning and preventative strategies, as well as retro30. Lon Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. C AL. L. R EV. 305, 306-07
(1971).
31. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 5 (suggesting that courts have
limited remedial imaginations, not because judges are not imaginative, but because common
law and statutes and the very structure of the legal system limit what courts are a llowed to do
and what solutions they are allowed to see).
32. See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. H AZARD, E THICS IN THE P RACTICE OF LAW (1978) (discus sing
complex duties of lawyers to organizations); DAVID MURRAY, ETHICS IN ORGANIZATIONS :
VALUES, CODES , VISION, S TRATEGIES , ACTION (1997).
33. See Ellen Waxman & Howard Gadlin, A Breed Apart: An Ombudsman Serves as a
Buffer Between and Among Individuals and Large Institutions, DISP . R ESOL. M AG., Summer
1998, at 21.
34. For a trenchant critique of “false” harmony values in our mediation culture, see Laura
Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST . J. ON DISP . R ESOL. 1 (1993).
35. See Janet Reno, Lawyers as Problem-Solvers: Keynote Address to the AALS, 49 J.
LEGAL EDUC . 5 (1999).
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spective defenses and claims. What should the defense lawyer’s responsibilities be to the criminal defendant who has been successfully defended—acquitted—but who might in fact be guilty? What should the
lawyer’s responsibility be to prevent future crimes, including not just the
commonly mentioned individual crimes of bu rglary, etc., but corporate
crimes of pollution, unfair trade practices, inhumane employment policies? What responsibility should a prosecutor feel for the conviction he
achieves when he knows the defendant is headed for a prison system
that will educate him in new ways of committing crimes?36 What responsibility should a lawyer feel for the community when he has won a zoning variance or tax relief for a d eveloper? These examples suggest that
there might be commitments beyond the client when the lawyer’s own
actions or work allow the client to do things that affect others. Our current rules recognize that lawyers may be ethically liable when their a ctions have been implicated in their clients’ fraudulent acts.37 To the extent that lawyers’ actions cause harm to others, what responsibilities
should the lawyer have for preventing or resolving such problems before
they occur?
What if every law student and lawyer asked at the beginning of every
traditional case: What caused this dilemma? This problem? Is the dispute just the tip of an iceberg where the whole iceberg needs melting?
What is the larger context in which this problem is situated? What would
need to be done to fix the problem or to address the concerns of the parties and those affected by whatever decisions might be made? This more
pro-active approach to legal problem solving would involve the lawyer in
different functions and tasks than those now often employed within traditional legal paradigms and skills. Problem solving and mediation literature commonly speak of lawyers who define problems narrowly (dispute resolvers or litigators) and those who seek broader issue definition
for broader problem resolution.38 Should one’s ethical duties be commensurate with the size of the problem or responsibilities that one takes
on?39
Lawyers, for example, might be instrumental in convening meetings
of interested groups40 seeking to resolve issues before, during, or after
lawsuits, using very different techniques than traditional adversarial approaches. In a variety of complex disputes, including block grant allocation, environmental clean up and siting, municipal funding and govern-

36. See Robert Suro, Law & Order: Counting Toward 100,000 More Police, W ASH. POST ,
June 1, 1999, at A-13 (excerpting Janet Reno’s graduation speech to Tulane Law School).
37. See, e.g., MODEL R ULES Rules 1.2, 1.6, 3.3, 4.1 (1995) [hereinafter MODEL R ULES].
38. See, e.g., Leonard Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies and
Techniques, 1 HARV. N EGOTIATION L. R EV. 7, 13 (1996) (providing a grid for categorizing types
of mediation).
39. For example, Judith Maute has argued that mediators should bear greater ethical responsibility when they “preside” over cases where parties are not represented. See Ju dith
Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case for Mediator Accountability, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 503, 508 (1991).
40. See Philip Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982)
(discussing the role lawyers might play in negotiations concerning administrative procedure);
see also Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State , 45 UCLA L.
R EV. 1 (1997).
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ance, racial tensions, police accountability and reorganizations of human
services agencies, new kinds of processes, variously called “consensus
building,”41 strategic planning, joint problem solving, community education,42 public conversations43 and meeting facilitation,44 have been used
by lawyers and others to facilitate new forms of problem solving with
multiple parties and interested stakeholders. These new processes may
very well need new kinds of rules or expectations about their own ethics
and professionalism, where service is to groups of people who are not
“clients” in the strictly legal or adversarial sense. Duties to explain the
legal significance of these processes clearly, to treat confidentiality differently, to be accountable to various affected parties,45 and to be neutral
and unbiased may take on different meanings in these new contexts.
Even within more traditional lawyer roles, the current rules must respond to the many ways in which lawyers are intersecting with less conventional forms of legal process. Some states have already recognized
the new ethical obligation of the lawyer to advise and counsel the client
about other means for resolving problems beyond the obvious choice of
litigation. Colorado and Georgia, for example, have required lawyers to
discuss alternative processes with clients,46 and now, many courts, especially those with mandatory ADR programs, may require such counseling as a matter of procedural, rather than ethical mandates. If the lawyer’s responsibilities are to help clients, and possibly others, achieve
their legitimate ends, then advice about the most effective and efficient
way to achieve those goals would seem to be an obvious and integral part
of the lawyer’s obligations.
To the extent that lawyers may interact more directly, either with represented, or even with unrepresented parties,47 what obligations ought
lawyers to have in dealing directly with parties who are not their own clients?48

41. See, e.g., CONSENSUS BUILDING H ANDBOOK, supra note 8.
42. See Ingrid Eagly, Community Education: Creating a New Vision of Legal Services
Practice, 4 CLINICAL L. R EV. 433 (1998).
43. See, e.g., Symposium, Innovations in Process: New Applications for ADR, DISP .
R ESOL. M AG., Winter 1997, at 1.
44. See R OGER SCHWARZ, THE SKILLED F ACILITATOR: PRACTICAL W ISDOM FOR DEVELOPING
EFFECTIVE GROUPS (1994).
45. See, e.g., Larry Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem,
6 VT . L. R EV. 1 (1981). But see Joseph Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Medi a tion: A Reply
to Professor Susskind, 6 VT . L. R EV. 85 (1981).
46. See, e.g., COLORADO R ULES OF P ROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1992); GA. R. C IV. P.
Rule EC7-5; see also Art Garwin, Show Me the Offer, A.B.A. J., June 1997, at 84; Mich. State
Bar Comm. on Prof. and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. RI-255 & RI-262; Kan sas Bar Assoc.
Comm. on Ethics-Advisory Services, Op. 94-01; Pennsylvania Bar Assoc. Eth ics, Op. 90-125.
47. See Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Law yers’ Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CALIF . L. R EV. 79, 81-82 (1997) (argu ing that more enforcement and clarification of Model Rule 4.3 and Model Rule DR 7104(A)(2) is needed when lawyers act adversarily with those who are unrepresented and cannot
protect themselves).
48. A growing body of law is taking on the question of what responsibilities and liabilities
lawyers may have to third parties who are not their clients, but who may rely on their work or
representations. See, e.g., Symposium, The Lawyer’s Duties and Liabilities to Third Parties, 37
S. T EX. L. R EV. 957 (1996).
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In exploring the lawyer’s role as “peacemaker,” my principal concern
here, I want to focus on the role that lawyers play when they assist parties in resolving disputes outside of court or utilize new forms of appropriate dispute resolution, even in transactional work, or “transactional
ADR,” as I have come to call it. Our conventional rules of ethics are particularly inapposite when lawyers serve in quasi-judicial roles as arbitrators,49 or as mediators, facilitating negotiations among and between
parties, but not deciding anything. Third party neutrals, like mediators
and consensus-building facilitators, seldom decide cases or “find” facts.
Such people are trained to probe for parties’ underlying needs and interests and to focus on commonalities as well as differences. Rather than
focusing on aggressive persuasiveness, third party neutrals ask parties
and their lawyers to use creativity, patience, persistence, flexibility and
resilience, without rigid or premature closure on a problem. Some processes are particular to the forms—caucuses and other separate meetings
with parties and stakeholders look like ex parte contacts, which would
ordinarily be prohibited by traditional rules of legal ethics, but, in these
contexts, separate meetings are often contracted for, though perhaps still
require some ethical regulation 50 like requiring disclosure of practices
and clarity regarding confidentiality obligations.51
Many mediators and facilitators seek to involve all “stakeholders,”
like insurers or relevant community members, even when they are not
formally part of a lawsuit, thus complicating the layers of involvement
lawyers may have with different participants. Mediation and other less
adversarial problem-solving techniques produce different outcomes. For
example, the outcomes may be provisional and dynamic, rather than decided and static and may require continuous monitoring and continuing
relations with the parties.
Lawyers also perform different functions as “representatives” in these
other processes. Several commentators have suggested that because lawyers’ roles in these settings are so different, these alternative techniques
require new rules and different terminology. 52 In part, because of the in49. Many think that the Judicial Code of Conduct can be used as a benchmark for ethical
standards and professionalism in situations where lawyers play adjudicative roles. I do not
agree, since the judge has a permanent role, which allows him to be at arms length from parties
on a regular basis. Arbitrators who may depend on parties choosing and pa ying them may be
closer to lawyers seeking clients in some respects, while resembling judges in others. The
American Arbitration Association has promulgated several ethics codes for arbitrators, taking
account of the different subject matters in which they operate. See, e.g., ETHICAL R ULES FOR
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS (1977) (now under revision); ETHICAL R ULES FOR LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATORS .
50. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ex Parte Talks with Neutrals: ADR Hazards , 12
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG . 109 (1994).
51. Some sophisticated states now statutorily regulate matters like confidentiality in mediation. See NANCY R OGERS & CRAIG MCEWEN, M EDIATION: LAW, POLICY, P RACTICE (2d ed.
1994). The current draft of a proposed Uniform Mediation Act being considered by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws deals with some of these issues as substantive regulatory matters. See Richard C. Reuben & Nancy Rogers, Uniform Mediation Act
Goes Public for Comments, DISP. R ESOL. M AG., Summer 1999, at 18-19.
52. See, e.g. , Roger Fisher, What about Negotiation as a Specialty?, 69 A.B.A. J. 1221
(1983) (advocating negotiation as specialization, apart from strategical litigation tech niques);
Robert W. Rack, Jr. Settle or Withdraw: Collaborative Lawyering Provides Incen tives to
Avoid Costly Litigation, DISP . RESOL. M AG., Summer 1998, at 8 (discussing a new trend toward
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creased use of “warmer”53 dispute resolution techniques, we are b eginning to reexamine what the appropriate level of candor should be between lawyers in both private negotiation settings and in certain ADR
settings.54 If the ethical reference point is “solving the problem”, “doing
justice” or even “achieving Pareto optimal solutions” rather than winning, zeal, or the “adversary system excuse,” then we will have to consider the opposing side more as a “joint venturer” than an adversary.
Furthermore, we may be in many settings where there is no adversary at
all, or where adversarialism may shift from time to time, in all its postmodern glory, with coalitions concentrating on different issues within a
transaction or dispute.55 Lawyers would be called on to facilitate, create
and synthesize, as well as to analyze, argue and criticize. Learning to
“think out of the box” and be creative about solutions would be contradictory to the conventional lawyer’s approach—simply looking for the
best precedent.
As these new roles for lawyers proliferate, new ethical issues arise for
which there are no clear answers. Some suggest it is too early to crystallize these new forms of practice and rigidify them with rules or regulations, or use professional regulation to act as a gatekeeper to a new profession with many possible disciplinary homes. While I am sympathetic
to these arguments and have long supported flexibility in developing
these creative approaches to problem solving, we simply cannot ignore
the numerous professionalism issues surroun ding this new area of practice.
First, a lawyer engaging in these kinds of non- or less- adversarial
situations56 is still disciplinable as a lawyer for the things she does in any
“collaborative lawyering” in which lawyers and clients enter contractual agreements to “negotiate in good faith until an agreement is found”).
53. David Smith, A Warmer Way of Disputing: Mediation and Conciliation, 26 AM . J.
COMP . L. 205 (1978).
54. See Philip Schrag & Lisa Lerman, Testimony Before Ethics Commission 2000, (June
4, 1999). In the last attempt to change the ethics rules, there were proposals to make candor a
process requirement of negotiation and “conscionability” a substantive requirement. See
MODEL R ULES Rules 4.2, 4.3 (Discussion Draft 1983). In this era scholars debated whether can dor and a standard of preventing “unconscionability” in lawyer-assisted negotiations were en forceable in arenas of totally private behavior. See Murray Schwartz, The Professionalism and
Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL L. REV. 669, 682-83 (1978); see also James J. White, Ma chiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotia tions , 1980 AM . B. F OUND R ES. J.
926, 927-28 (arguing that ethical norms may be violated more readily in negotiation setting because of the private nature of the parties’ interactions). For a more modern view of the selfenforcing market in reputational ethics see Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic
of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 493, 501 (1989) (arguing that a “functionalist” approach to bargaining produces ethical behavior by making negotiation reputation more public).
55. See Gary Goodpaster, Coalitions and Representative Bargaining, 9 OHIO ST . J. ON
DISP . R ESOL. 243, 250 (1994) (“Coalition formation occurs when parties negotiate an alliance
agreement, formally or informally, expressly or tacitly.”).
56. One must remember that many of these alternative processes have their adversarial
components. Presentations by representatives in arbitration are as adversary as any activity
that lawyers engage in, and even mediation presentations have become increasingly adversa rial, opportunistic and gaming over time as experienced lawyer-advocates become party representatives and mediators. See Gail Cox, Arbitration is No Simple Matter, NAT’L L.J. , June 28,
1999, at A1; BENNETT P ICKER, MEDIATION P RACTICE GUIDE; A H ANDBOOK FOR R ESOLVING
BUSINESS DISPUTES (1998) (providing guidance to practitioners in an increasingly more formal
area of legal work); CPR I NSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE R ESOLUTION, M EDIATOR ’S DESKBOOK (K. Scan lon ed., 1999) (same).
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setting if the conduct violates the applicable lawyer disciplinary rules.57
Besides lawyer ethics codes, there are pesky questions of potential legal
malpractice liability. So far, I am not aware of any reported case in which
a lawyer has been held liable for mediator malpractice; however, I have
heard of unreported settlements. Liability coverage is now being underwritten for mediator malpractice, and there are reported cases of unsuccessful efforts to hold lawyers liable for their actions as third party neutrals.58
The proliferation of ethics codes and standards by a variety of third
party neutral professional associations59 makes clear that those who
practice these forms of problem solving, professional facilitation, and
“neutraling” see a need to professionalize by having standards and exerting some form of quality control over those who perform such services. Though such efforts are often criticized as market control projects,
most of these organizations have active ethics committees that hear
complaints from consumers and also attempt to d evelop “best practices”
standards.
Furthermore, ADR practi tioners are actively seeking ethical guidance
when faced with the complex ethical issues confronting third party neutrals, parties themselves and their representatives in these processes. I
have canvassed most of these issues at length els ewhere, 60 but they include such formal, rule-based issues as conflicts of interests,61 fees,62
confidentiality and disclosures of harm, 63 neutrality and impartiality,
competence, aiding unauthorized practice and relevant duties of candor
and disclosure, as well as good faith participation in both private (contractual) and public (court-sponsored or ordered) proceedings. 64 And, if
57. Such rules might include confidentiality rules, contacts with unrepresented parties,
fees, advertising, and practicing with nonlawyers or others.
58. See Lange v. Marshall, 622 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. App. 1981) (involving an attempt to sue
mediator for malpractice); see also Wagshall v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (in volving suit against mediator and holding that while acting as court-appointed mediator and
performing within the scope of duty, mediators enjoy immunity from damages); Ho ward v.
Drapkin, 222 Cal. App. 3d 843, 848 (1990); Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
812 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1987). See generally Arthur A. Chaykin, Mediator Liability: A
New Role for Fiduciary Duties, 53 U. CIN . L. R EV. 731 (1984) (discussing several theories of l iability and advocating a “fiduciary duties approach” to address mediator misconduct).
59. For example, the American Arbitration Association, the Academy of Family Mediators,
and the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution are such associations.
60. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 1;
Menkel-Meadow, Silences of the Restatment; see also Baruch Bush, The Dilemmas of Media tion Practice: A Study of Ethical Dilemmas and Policy Implications, 1 J. DISP . RESOL. 1 (1994),
reprinted in DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES 385 (1996); Leonard L. Riskin, Toward New Stan dards for the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26 ARIZ . L. R EV. 329, 329-30
(1984) (proposing new standards and ethical obligations for mediators).
61. Examples of conflicts of interest include those that lawyer-mediators have with current, past or potential future representational clients, as well as past, present or poten tial future
mediation clients, and conflicts that lawyer-mediators have with imputation of their conflicts to
other members of their firm.
62. ADR practitioners face questions regarding the ethics of contingent fees and feesplitting with nonlawyers.
63. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345-49 (1976) (applying duty of
psychologists to disclose “confidential” facts about a patient to prevent harm to a third party).
64.
See Edward Sherman, Court Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Forms
of Participation Should be Required?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2079, 2089 (1993) (discussing the “five
frequently encountered forms of participation that may be required to comply with court-
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a lawyer has a duty to correct a fraud on the court under Model Rule 3.3,
should a mediator have to correct known perjurious or fraudulent testimony in a later proceeding on the same matter if the mediator knows the
information is false?65
Beyond the more formalistic ethical dilemmas are other practice issues such as what the mediator should do when she knows one side is
misrepresenting facts or law to the other side or to the medi ator; what
authority a mediator or other third party neutral has to order disclosure
of information, and how information should be treated when it is not
otherwise discoverable (what I have called proprietary “settlement
facts”); what is appropriate for the mediator to do when there are resource or other power differentials between the parties; what role should
the mediator play in designing, transmitting and formalizing offers, solutions and agreement drafting; what accountability should the mediator
feel for whatever agreement or solution she presides over?
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, parties to these new nonadversarial processes need some understanding of what the ground rules
are, where they can go to complain about perceived unfair or corrupt
processes, and what relation these processes have to more formal legal
processes. To the extent that legal ethics rules have been justified by reference to professional function or legal institutions, these newer, less
adversarial processes must develop their animating rationales and just ifications to gain acceptability and legitimacy. If non-adversarial processes are to offer better ways of solving human and legal problems, then
they must be able to demonstrate that they have coherent ethics and
standards of quality and professionalism to those who would use these
services. While many argue that the market will adequately control and
police here,66 a new field, coupled with the complications of multiple disciplinary roots, presents enormous information asymmetries to wouldbe users. To that end, ethicists in these fields are now engaged in the
complicated work of developing best practices and both aspirational and
positivistic ethical codes.
I want to close with a classic dilemma in legal ethics, one that has
been revisited every time we draft new rules of ethics: Should our ethics
codes be aspirational, seeking to express best practices and suggested
goals for how we can best do our work and often expressed in grandiose,
if inspirational, language? Or, do we need to regulate for Holmes’
bad(man) professional?67 Must we make rules clear and draft with an eye

ordered ADR: good faith participation; exchange of position papers and objective information;
minimum meaningful participation; participation with settlement authority; and obligation to
pay the third-party neutral’s fee”).
65. Clearly no current rule or legal standard requires such an undertaking, but courts are
beginning to subpoena mediators to testify about a variety of matters involving their work. See,
e.g., Carmen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 794-95 (8th Cir. 1997) (hold ing that
employee communications to a mediator were not protected from discovery by an ombudsman
privilege). But see Reginald Alleyne, Mediator Immunity, CHRON. J. OF NAT’L ACAD. OF ARB.,
Mar. 1989, 1 (mediator suggesting he will refuse to testify in order to protect confide n tiality as
duty of mediator).
66. See, e.g., Pearce, Law Day 2050, supra note 4.
67. See OLIVER W ENDELL HOLMES , J R., THE P ATH OF THE LAW (1968).
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toward the lawyer who will use the rules in the most technocratic way68
to avoid them and seek self-interest wherever possible?
I leave you with two different formulations, which I have worked on
over the past few years. First is an aspirational code expressing the ten
most important responsibilities that I think lawyers should undertake
when acting in these new capacities. Second, appended to this essay is a
detailed and complex ethical rule, currently under submission to the
ABA’s Ethics Commission 2000 on the possible revision of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct and to the many states enacting ethical
rules for third party neutrals.69 I welcome comments and reactions to
these formulations. What I most wish to express, however, is that although the ethical issues are difficult and the analogies to the lawyer’s
role as adversary or advocate will not take us very far to resolve these
problems, I do not want the complexity of the ethical issues to prevent
lawyers from engaging in these new roles; they are difficult and unfamiliar to those with conve ntional legal educations.70 These new roles are
our future—in our ability to find new ways to solve problems and meet
human needs—and these, it seems to me, are appropriate goals for our
profession and our human ethics.
II. THE TEN COMMANDMENTS OF APPROPRIATE DISPUTE R ESOLUTION : AN
ASPIRATIONAL CODE71
1. Lawyers should have an obligation to consider and inform the
client about the possible methods of resolving a dispute, planning a
transaction, or participating in legislative, administrative or other pro cesses that might best address the client’s needs. Lawyers should educate
themselves and their clients about all available options for handling the
client’s matter.
2. Lawyers should promptly communicate all proposals to resolve disputes by any process suggested by other parties, clients or decision-makers.
3. Lawyers should consider and promptly communicate all substantive proposals for dispute resolution or transactional agreements to
their clients, including both legally based remedies and resolutions and
68. See Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. C AL. L. R EV. 885, 885 (1996) (contrasting “technocratic” rule manipulation of
ethics rules with more discretionary and “sentimentally relevant ethical deliberation).
69. This proposed Rule applies to lawyers acting as third party neutrals only—not to oth ers who may also engage in these activities.
70. Currently, several projects are underway to attempt to introduce more conflict resolu tion and problem solving in legal education including the CPR Commission on Legal Education
and Problem Solving, funded by the Open Society Institute; the Missouri-Columbia curriculum
integration and dissemination project, funded by FIPSE; and an in terdisciplinary seminar on
conflict resolution in the law school curriculum at Stanford, funded by the Hewlett Foundation.
As with all attempts to change legal education, only outside funding seems to motivate legal
educators to look at new subject matter and new pedagogy, but that is a subject for another day!
71. These aspirational standards were developed through my work with the ABA Section
on Dispute Resolution, Ethics Sub-Committee; the Committee has not endorsed these or any
other formal formulations of ethics rules for the non-adversarial lawyer. The full section of Dispute Resolution endorsed another set of standards, but these standards have never been ap proved by the ABA’s House of Delegates. See ABA/AAA/SPIDR, STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR
MEDIATORS (1994).
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those that address other needs or interests. Lawyers should assist clients
to consider non-legal concerns including social, ethical, economic, psychological and moral implications of any possible solutions or proposals.
4. Lawyers should not misrepresent to or conceal from another
person, a rel evant fact or legal principle (including opposing counsel,
parties, judicial officers, third party neutrals or other individuals who
might rely on such statements).
5. Lawyers should not intentionally or recklessly deceive another
or refuse to answer material and relevant questions in representing clients.
6. Lawyers as representatives should not agree to a resolution of
a problem or participation in a transaction that they have reason to
know will cause substantial injustice to the other party. In e ssence, a
lawyer should do no harm.
7. A lawyer serving as a third party neutral should decline to approve or otherwise sanction an agreement achieved by parties which the
third party neutral has reason to know would effect an injustice on a
party (or third party).
8. Lawyers serving as third party neutrals, such as arbitr ators
and mediators, should disclose all reasons the parties might consider
relevant in determining if the neutrals have any bias, prejudice or basis
for not acting fairly and without improper interest in a matter.
9. Lawyers serving as client representatives or as third party
neutrals should fully explain to their clients and parties any and all processes and procedures that will be used to facilitate solutions, make
claims, or plan transactions so parties can understand and participate in
the decision about what procedures to use.
10. Lawyers should treat all parties to a legal matter as they
would wish to be treated themselves and should consider the effects of
what they accomplish for their clients. In essence, lawyers should respect
a lawyers’ golden rule.72

72. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic Gain or Pa ter nalistic Judgment: A Proposal for a Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA. L. R EV. 761, 764 (discussing the Golden Rule and its application in the lawyering context) (1990); see also Leslie
Griffin, Whose Duties and Liabilities to Third Parties?, 37 S. T EX. L. R EV. 1191, 1191 (1996) (arguing that lawyers should be treated as all others in the professional liability context for liability
to third parties).
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III. PROPOSED MODEL R ULE OF P ROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR THE LAWYER
AS THIRD P ARTY N EUTRAL 73
The Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR, sponsored by
Georgetown University and CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution has
drafted this proposed Model Rule for adoption into the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. 74 We offer here a framework or architecture for
consideration by the appropriate bodies of the American Bar Association
and any state agency or legislature charged with drafting lawyer ethics
rules.75
The proposed Model Rule addresses the ethical responsibilities of
lawyers serving as third party neutrals in a variety of ADR fora (arbitration, mediation, early neutral evaluation, etc.). As an initial jurisdictional
matter, the proposed Rule does not address the ethical requirements of
nonlawyers performing these duties76 or the ethical duties of lawyers
acting in ADR proceedings as representatives or advocates.77

73. The Model Rule of Professional Conduct for the Lawyer as Third Party Neutral has
been prepared by the CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR, spo n sored by CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution and Georgetown University Law Ce n ter, with
support from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. The rule’s reporters i n clude Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Professor of Law, Georgetown University and Chair, CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR, and Elizabeth Plapinger, Vice President, CPR and
Staff Director, CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR.
The Rule’s drafters are members of the CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Stan dards in ADR Drafting Committee. The committee is part of the CPR-Georgetown Commission’s Working Group on ADR and Law Practice. The Drafting Committee includes the Honorable Jerome Simandle, the Honorable Edmund Spaeth, John Bickerman, Esq., Lawrence Fox,
Esq., Duane Krohnke, Esq., Bruce Meyerson, Esq., Professor Nancy Rogers, Elizabeth Plap inger, Esq. and Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow. Professor Geoffrey Hazard served as a con sultant and commentator for the group.
74. Earlier efforts have produced suggestions for additions to the Model Rules regard ing
ADR. See, e.g., Judith Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case For Mediator Accountability, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503 (1991) (suggesting reform in the mediation con text);
Robert A. Baruch-Bush, The Dilemmas of Mediation Practice: A Study of Ethical Dilemmas
and Policy Implications, 1 J. DISP . R ESOL. 1, 3 (1994) (reviewing ethical issues facing medi ators). The CPR-Georgetown effort attempts to remedy some of the inadequacies of transdisciplinary ethical code drafting as well as the silences of current legal ethics formulations. See,
e.g., AAA/ABA/SPIDR MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (adopted in 1994 but
not ratified to date by the ABA Board of Governors); Carrie Men kel-Meadow, The Silences of
the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: Lawyer ing as Only Adversary Practice, 10
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 631 (1997) (discussing the forthcoming Restatement of Laws Governing
Lawyers’ failing attempt at dealing with ethical issues raised by ADR practice).
75. The proposed Rule is in progress and the Drafting Committee welcomes all comments
to Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow at Georgetown University Law Center, 600 New Jersey
Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001 (meadow@law.georgetown.edu) or Elizabeth Plapinger,
Vice President, CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, 366 Madison Avenue, New York, New
York 10017 (eplapinger@cpradr.org).
76. The proposed Rule is designed for incorporation into lawyer ethical codes. The question of what other agencies may promulgate transdisciplinary rules—such as the
AAA/ABA/SPIDR Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators , or state statutes governing all
mediators, for example—is not addressed.
77. This rule attempts to regulate solely the ethical responsibilities of lawyers serving as
neutrals and does not deal with other issues such as the potentially different duties of lawyers
as representatives or advocates within ADR settings. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Mediation Representation: A Road Map of Critical Issues, DISP. R ESOL. M AG., Winter 1997, at 3
(discussing whether a different set of ethical rules for lawyers involved in the mediation con text
is necessary and desirable).
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R ULE 4.5 THE L AWYER AS T HIRD P ARTY N EUTRAL78
A. Preamble
As client representatives, public citizens and professionals com mitted to justice and fair and efficient legal process, lawyers should help clients, and others needing legal assistance, pursue the most effective
resolution of legal problems. This obligation should include pursuing
methods and outcomes that cause the least harm to all parties, that resolve matters amicably where possible, and that promote harmonious
relations. Modern lawyers serve these values of justice, fairness, efficiency and harmony as partisan representatives and as third party neutrals.
This Rule applies to the lawyer who acts as a third party neutral to
help represented or unrepresented parties resolve disputes or arrange
transactions among each other. When lawyers act in neutral, nonrepresentative capacities, they have different duties and obligations in
the areas addressed by this Rule than lawyers acting in a representative
capacity. The current Model Rules are silent on lawyer roles as third
party neutrals, which are different from the representational functions
addressed by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and judicial
functions governed by the Judicial Code of Conduct. 79
Contemporary law practice involves lawyers in a variety of new roles
within the traditional boundaries of counselors, advocates and advisors
in the legal system. Now lawyers commonly serve as third party neutrals,
either as facilitators to settle disputes or plan transactions, as in mediation, or as third party decision-makers, as in arbitration. Such proceedings, including mediation, arbitration and other hybrid forms of settlement or decision making, occur both as adjuncts to the litigation process—either through a court referral or court-based program, or by an
agreement between the parties—and outside litigation via private
agreement. These proceedings are commonly known as “ADR” pro cesses.80 Some state ethics codes, statutes or court rules now require or

78. The proposed Rule is numbered Rule 4.5 (contemplating an addition to the Model
Rules section on “Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients,” in simple numerical o rder).
Ideally, “The Lawyer as Third Party Neutral” would be a new Rule 4, renumerating cu rrent
rules.
Where possible, we use language, definitions, standards and formulations consistent with the
current Model Rules. We also take note, where pertinent, of the ongoing work of the Ethics
2000 Commission of the American Bar Association, which is proposing revisions to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, and the forthcoming Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, ratified by the American Law Institute in May 1999.
79. See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 1, at 430
(indicating the different “foundational principles” in non-adversarial practice, such as joint gain
over individual gain, “future orientation” rather than “past orientation,” thus illu strating a need
for a separate regulatory scheme).
80. The term “ADR” is used here to connote “appropriate dispute resolution,” suggesting a
choice of methods to be used to fit the matter. In more common parlance, ADR is used to con note “ alternative dispute resolution” processes, which are seen as alternatives to more conven tional trial or litigation methods.
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strongly suggest that lawyers have a duty to counsel their clients regarding ADR means.81
When lawyers serve as ADR neutrals they do not have partisan clients, as contemplated in much of the Model Rules; rather, they serve all
of the parties. Lawyer neutrals do not represent parties, but they have a
duty to be fair to all participants in the process and to fufill different obligations and responsibilities with respect to the parties and process.82
Nor do the rules that apply to judges, such as the Judicial Code of Co nduct, adequately deal with many issues confronting lawyer neutrals. For
example, lawyers who act as third party neutrals in one case may serve
as representational counsel in other matters and, thus, confront special
conflicts of interest, appearance of impropriety, and confidentiality issues as they switch roles.83 Unlike the judge or arbitrator who remains at
arms length from the parties and who usually hears information usually
only when both parties are present, mediators have different ethical issues to contend with as they hear private, proprietary facts from both
sides, in caucuses and ex parte communications. 84
While there continues to be some controversy about whether serving
as a mediator or arbitrator is the practice of law or may be covered by
the ancillary practice Rule 5.7,85 it is clear that lawyers serving as third
81. See, e.g., Marshall Breger, Should an Attorney be Required to Advise a Client on ADR
Options? (discussion paper prepared for the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution and distributed
at ABA Annual Meeting (1998)) (including listing of relevant statutes, court rules and ethical
provisions); COLORADO R ULE OF P ROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1; GEORGIA R ULES OF CIVIL
P ROCEDURE EC 7-5 (1996).
82. While the third party neutral does not represent or advocate for any of the parties to
an ADR proceeding, in some circumstances, the third party neutral may provide info rmation or
advice to the parties without establishing a representational relationship. See infra, notes 85
and 86 and accompanying text.
83. See Poly Software Int’l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Utah 1995) (hold ing
that if a mediator hears confidential information through the course of a mediation, he may not
represent a party in the same matter or one of substantial relation unless all parties to the mediation proceedings consent after disclosure).
84. See Cho v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 863-64 (1995) (holding that a law
firm must be disqualified from a proceeding after hiring “the retired judge who had pr esided
over the action and had received ex parte confidences from the opposing party in the course of
settlement proceedings”). The Judicial Code of Conduct may also need revision to address new
judicial roles in ADR, such as referral to ADR processes, ex parte communications with parties
and third party neutrals, as well as judicial roles in settlement conferences. See Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Ex Parte Talks with Neutrals: ADR Haz ards, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 109, 109 (1994); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ju dicial Referral to ADR: Issues &
Problems Faced by Judges, 7 F.J.C. DIRECTIONS 8, 8 (1994).
85. In 1994, Professor Geoffrey Hazard opined that activities in ADR can be consid ered
“ancillary” functions of the lawyer, under current Rule 5.7, making the Model Rules applicable
to lawyers serving in ADR situations. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., When ADR is Ancillary to a
Legal Practice, Law Firms Must Confront Conflicts Issues, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 147, 147 (1994). The Commission believes that subsequent analysis and case law support
the need for the new rule proposed here. See Cho, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 863; see also Poly Software
Int’l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1490-91 (D. Utah 1995); Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alter native Dispute Resolution, supra note 1, at 407; Menkel-Meadow, Silences of the Restatement,
supra note 1, at 631.
For commentary on the debate over whether mediation constitutes the practice of law, see
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice of Law, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 57 (1996); Bruce Meyerson, Lawyers Who Mediate are Not Practicing Law, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG . 74 (1996); Symposium, Is Mediation the Practice of Law,
NIDR Forum, June 1997; Geetha Ravindra, When Mediation Becomes the Unauthor ized Prac-
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party neutrals need ethical guidance from the Model Rules with respect
to their dual roles as partisan representatives and as neutrals. The drafters believe it is especially important to develop clear ethical rules when
the lawyer, commonly conceived of as a pa rtisan representative, takes on
the different role of neutral problem solver, facilitator or decision maker.
Lawyers may be disciplined for any violation of the Model Rules or
misconduct, regardless of whether they are formally found to be serving
in lawyer-like roles. Accordingly, while other associations provide guidance within specific contexts,86 when lawyers serve as mediators or arbitrators, their ethical duties and discipline under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct may be implicated. For these reasons, this proposed Rule is submitted to provide guidance for la wyers who serve as
third party neutrals and to advise judicial officers and state discipline
counsel who enforce lawyer ethical or disciplinary standards. 87
B. Scope of the Proposed Model Rule
The proposed Model Rule is drafted to govern lawyers serving in the
full array of ADR neutral roles: as arbitrators, mediators, evaluators, and
in other hybrid processes. The Drafting Committee believes that a general rule governing lawyers, serving in all third party neutral roles is appropriate because the proposed Rule a ddresses core ethical duties that
apply to virtually all neutral roles. Where different neutral roles give rise
to different duties and obligations, the proposed Rule so provides in text
or comment.88 A single rule is also consistent with the generally transsubstantive approach of the Model Rules. As the Model Rules recognize
increasing diversity of lawyer roles, separate rules for lawyers as mediators or arbitrators may be appropriate in the future.89
The proposed Rule applies only to lawyers serving as third party
neutrals.90 Many other professionals now serve as arbitrators, mediators,
conciliators, evaluators or ombuds, and other bodies have promulgated
transdisciplinary ethical rules relating to those services.91 When a lawyer
tice of Law, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG . 94 (1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, To the
Editors: Is Mediation the Practice of Law? Redux, NIDR News, Nov.-Dec. 1997, Jan. 1998, at
2.
86. See, e.g., AAA/ABA, THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES
(1977).
87. Whether third party neutrals will be liable in malpractice or on other legal
theories to parties to an ADR is a question of state law.
88. In facilitating dispute resolution and planning transactions, in a variety of ways, ne u trals may have different obligations with respect to various issues and within various contexts.
For example, where ex parte or caucus sessions are used, different issues surrounding confidentiality may arise. Further, multiple use of a single neutral by one party may raise conflict of
interest questions, depending on the neutral’s role, the parties’ agreement and the relevant ju risdictional regulations. See infra proposed Rule 4.5.4.
89. See MODEL R ULES Rules 1.13 (Organization as Client), 2.1 (Lawyer as Advisor), 3.8,
(Special Responsibilities of Lawyer as Prosecutor).
90. Also, the proposed Rule mainly governs issues of individual, ethical responsibility
rather than organizational duties. However, with respect to conflicts of interest, both ind ividual
and organizational responsibilities are stated in the “imputation and screening” rule. See infra
proposed Rule 4.5.4(b).
91. See, e.g., ABA/AAA/SPIDR MODEL STANDARDS FOR MEDIATORS (1994); SPIDR,
ETHICAL STANDARDS OF P ROFESSIONAL R ESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SOCIETY OF P ROFESSIONALS IN
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serves as a third party neutral in a capacity governed by multiple sets of
ethical standards, the lawyer must note that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct govern his/her duties as a lawyer neutral, and will govern the discipline of a third party neutral who is a lawyer.92 The proposed
Rule does not govern lawyers in their capacities as representatives or advocates within ADR proceedings. When a lawyer serves as an advocate,
representative or counselor to a party in an ADR proceeding, he or she is
governed by such other rules as are applicable to lawyer conduct, either
before tribunals93 or in relation to all other third parties.94
The proposed Rule, where possible, uses the same language and definitions of other lawyer and judicial standards, including formulations
from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the Judicial Code of
Conduct, the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, 95
and the forthcoming Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. 96 As
the preamble to the Model Rules states, these rules are not to be used as
liability standards for malpractice or other purposes. On the other hand,
the forthcoming Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers recognizes
DISPUTE R ESOLUTION (1986); ACADEMY OF F AMILY MEDIATORS, MODEL STANDARDS OF P RACTICE
FOR F AMILY AND D IVORCE MEDIATION (1984).
92. This Rule distinguishes the lawyer’s role as a neutral from the lawyer who may serve
as an “intermediary” under Model Rule 2.2 and who therefore, “represents” several clients in an
“intermediation” of their relationship such as a partnership, joint ven ture, or in some cases, d ivorce proceedings. The American Bar Association’s Ethics 2000 Commission is currently reviewing the Model Rules and developing proposals for revision. A current Ethics Commission
proposal calls for the elimination of Model Rule 2.2.
93. See MODEL R ULES Rule 3.3.
94. See MODEL R ULES Rule 4.1. A joint initiative of the CPR-Georgetown Commission and
the ABA Dispute Resolution Section Ethics Committee is proposing amendments to the text
and comments of existing Model Rules to ad dress these issues. Among the issues being ad dressed by the Joint Initiative is the mean ing and scope of the term “tribunal” in the Model
Rules. The term “tribunal” in the Model Rules has been inte rpreted to apply to adjudicative or
trial-type hearings, thereby arguably excluding facilit ative-type processes. The Joint Initiative
drafters believe that the term should be clarified to include ADR proceedings which are not
adjudicative but held pursu ant to court rules and regulations, whether proceedings are held
within the courthouse or not.
The Joint Initiative, the Ethics 2000 Commission, and other groups are also considering current proposals to redraft Model Rules 3.3 and 4.1 to include increased duties of candor to tribu nals, to clients and other third parties (such as in the rectification of fraud). In ad dition, rules
that apply to the lawyer’s role as counselor, Rules 2.1-2.3, for example, and general rules of lawyer-client relations, such as confidentiality, Model Rule 1.6, might also need to be supplemented or amended to address different ethical responsibilities in different settings. See, e.g.,
Ethics 2000 Commission Rules 1.6, 3.3. Some have also suggested that the candor and good
faith participation duties be heightened in some forms of ADR proceedings. See, e.g., Kimberlee
K. Kovach, Lawyer Ethics in Mediation: Time for a Requirement of Good Faith, DISP . R ESOL.
MAG., Winter 1997, at 9 (“The rules and guidelines appropriate for an adversarial, third party
determined outcome, are, at best, inapplicable to a participatory, interest-based mutual problem-solving process.”).
95. AAA/ABA CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (1997); These
rules are currently being revised by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Code of Ethics for A rbitrators
in Commercial Disputes Convened by the Arbitration Committee, Section on Dispute Resol u tion, American Bar Association.
96. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers was ratified by the American Law
Institute in May 1999. For commentary on the Restatement’s failure to ad dress lawyering issues raised by ADR practice, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement, su pra note 1; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Non-Silences of Professor Hazard on “The S ilences of the
Restatement”: A Response to Professor Menkel-Meadow , 10 GEO. J. OF LEGAL ETHICS 671
(1997).
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that ethical rules and standards are often used for civil liability, as well
as for discipline, and this proposed Rule has been drafted accordingly.
C. Definitions
This Rule is intended to be applied to the duties and responsibil ities
of lawyers who act as third party neutrals in the following processes:
1. Adjudicative
Arbitration - A procedure in which each party presents its position
and evidence before a single, neutral third party or a panel, who is em powered to render a resolution of the matter between the pa rties. Arbitrators may be chosen jointly by all parties, by contractual arrangements,
under court or other rules, and, in some cases, may be chosen specifically by each side. Arbitrators chosen separately by each party to a dispute may be considered “partisan” arbitrators or “neutral” arbitrators,
depending on the rules governing the arbitration. If the parties agree in
advance or applicable law provides, the award is binding and enforceable
in the same manner as any contractual obligation or under applicable
statute (such as the Federal Arbitration Act or state equivalents).
Agreements by the parties or applicable law may provide rules for
whether the award must be in writing and what recourse the parties may
have when the arbitration is not binding.
2. Evaluative
Neutral Evaluation - A procedure in which a third party neutral provides an assessment of the positions of the parties. In a neutral evaluation process, lawyers and/or parties present summaries of the facts, evidence, and legal principles applicable to their cases to a single neutral or
a panel of neutral evaluators who then provide(s) an assessment of the
strengths, weaknesses, and potential value of the case to all sides. By
agreement of the parties or by applicable law, such evaluations are us ually non-binding and offered to facilitate settlement. By agreement of the
parties or by applicable law or practice, if the matter does not reach a
settlement, the neutral evaluator may also provide other services such as
case-planning guidance, discovery scheduling, or other settlement assistance. By agreement of the parties or applicable law, the neutral
evaluator(s) may issue fact-finding, discovery, and other reports or recommendations.
Mediation - A procedure in which a third party neutral facilitates
communications and negotiations among the parties to effect resolution
of the matter by agreement of the parties. In some forms of mediation
the third party neutral may engage in evaluative tasks, such as providing
legal information, helping parties and their counsel assess likely outcomes, and inquiring into the legal and factual strengths and weaknesses
of the problems presented. By agreement of the parties or applicable law,
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mediators may sometimes be called on to act as evaluators or special
discovery masters, or to perform other third party neutral roles.
3. Facilitative
Mediation - A procedure in which a third party neutral facilitates
communication and negotiations among the parties to seek resolution of
issues between the parties. Mediation is non-binding and does not, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, authorize the third party neutral
to evaluate (see above), decide or otherwise offer a judgment on the issues between the parties. If the mediation concludes in an agreement,
that agreement, if it meets otherwise applicable law co ncerning the enforceability of contracts, is enforceable as a contractual agreement.
Where authorized by applicable law, mediation agreements achieved
during pending litigation may be entered as court judgments.
4. Hybrid Processes
Minitrial - A procedure in which parties and their counsel present
their matter, which may include evidence, legal arguments, documents
and other summaries of their case, before a neutral third party and representatives of all parties, for the purpose of defining issues, pursuing
settlement negotiations, or otherwise sharing information. A neutral
third party, usually at the parties’ request, may issue an advisory opinion, which is non-binding unless the parties agree otherwise.
Med-arb - A procedure in which the parties initially seek mediation
of their dispute before a third party neutral, but, if they reach impasse,
may convert the proceeding into an arbitration in which the third party
neutral renders an award. This process may also occur in reverse, in
which, during a contested arbitration proceeding, the parties may agree
to seek facilitation of a settlement (mediation) from the third party neutral. In some cases, these third party neutral functions may be divided
between two separate individuals or panels of individuals.
Other - Parties, by agreement, or pursuant to court rules and regul ations, may create and utilize other dispute resolution processes before
third party neutral(s) in order to facilitate settlement, manage or plan
discovery and other case issues, seek fact-finding or conciliation services, improve communication, simplify or settle parts of cases, arrange
transactions or for other reasons. Such processes may be decisional
(adjudicative), facilitative or a hybrid of the two, and they may be binding or non-binding as party agreements or court rules or statutes provide.
Lawyers who provide neutral services as described above shall be
subject to the duties and obligations as specified below.
R ULE 4.5.1 DILIGENCE AND COMPETENCE
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(a) A lawyer serving as a third party neutral should act diligently, efficiently and promptly, subject to the standard of care owed the parties as
required by applicable law or contract.
(b) A lawyer serving as a third party neutral should decline to serve in
those matters in which the lawyer is not competent to serve.

Comment
Diligence
[1] Like its equivalent in representational work (see Model Rule 1.3,
discussing diligence in the lawyer-client relationship), this Rule requires
the ADR neutral to act diligently, efficiently and promptly, subject to the
duty of care owed the parties by applicable law or contract. Other rules
or specifications of timeliness and standards of care may be specified in
agreements of the parties, rules provided by relevant organizations, or by
applicable case law dealing with mediator or arbitrator civil liability. The
standard of care to be applied to the work of mediators and arbitrators is
currently evolving in practice and case law.
[2] The lawyer neutral should commit the ti me necessary to promote
prompt resolution of the dispute and should not let other matters interfere with the timely and efficient completion of the matter. If a lawyer
neutral cannot meet the parties’ expectations for prompt, diligent, and
efficient resolution of the dispute, the lawyer neutral should decline to
serve.
[3] While settlement or resolution is the goal of most ADR processes, the primary responsibility for the resolution of the dispute and the
shaping of a settlement in mediation and evaluation rests with the parties. Accordingly, when serving in a facilitative or evaluative process (see
definitions), the lawyer neutral should not coerce or i mproperly influence a party to make a decision, to continue participating in the process,
or to reach settlement or agreement.97
[4] When serving in an adjudicative or evaluative capacity, the lawyer neutral should decide all matters justly, exercising independent
judgment, without permitting outside pressure to affect the dec ision.
The lawyer neutral serving in adjudicative or evaluative roles should be
guided by judicial standards of diligence and competence.98
Competence

97. See F LORIDA R ULES FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT -APPOINTED MEDIATORS Rule 10.031
(1998).
98. See MODEL CODE OF J UDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3B; AAA/ABA C ODE OF ETHICS FOR
ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (1977).
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[5] A lawyer should decline appointment as a neutral when such appointment is beyond the lawyer’s competence. A lawyer neutral should
serve “only in cases where the neutral has sufficient knowledge [and
skill] regarding the process and subject matter to be effective.”99
[6] In determining whether a lawyer neutral has the requisite
knowledge and skill to serve as neutral in a particular matter and process, relevant factors may include: the parties’ reasonable expectations
regarding the ADR process and the neutral’s role, the procedural and
substantive complexity of the matter and process, the lawyer neutral’s
general ADR experience and training, legal experience, subject matter
expertise, the preparation the lawyer neutral is able to give to the matter,
and the feasibility of employing experts or co-neutrals with required
substantive or process expertise. In many instances, a lawyer neutral
may accept a neutral assignment where the requisite level of competence
can be achieved by reasonable preparation.
R ULE 4.5.2 CONFIDENTIALITY
(a) A lawyer serving as a third party neutral shall maintain the confidentiality of all information acquired in the course of serving as a third
party neutral, unless the third party neutral is required or permitted by
law or agreement of all the parties to disclose or use any otherwise confidential information.
(1) A third party neutral should discuss confidentiality rules and
requirements with the parties at the beginning of any proceeding and
obtain party consent with respect to any ex parte communication or
practice.
(2) As between the parties, the third party neutral shall maintain
confidentiality for all information disclosed to the third party neutral in
confidence by a party, unless the party agrees or specifies otherwise.
(3) A lawyer who has served as a third party neutral shall not
thereafter use information acquired in the ADR proceeding to the disa dvantage of any party to the ADR proceeding, except when the information has become publicly known or the parties have agreed otherwise or
except when necessary under section (b), below, or to defend the neutral
from a charge of misconduct.
(b) A third party neutral may use or disclose confidential information
obtained during a proceeding when and to the extent the third party b elieves necessary to prevent:
(1) death or serious bodily injury from occurring; or
(2) substantial financial loss from occurring in the matter at
hand as the result of a crime or fraud that a party has committed or intends to commit.
(c) Before using or disclosing information pursuant to section (b), if
not otherwise required to be disclosed, the third party neutral must, if
feasible, make a good faith effort to persuade the party’s counsel or the
99. SPIDR, ETHICAL STANDARDS OF P ROFESSIONAL R ESPONSIBILITY
P ROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE R ESOLU TION (1986).
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party, if the party is unrepresented, either not to act or to warn those
who might be harmed by the party’s action.
Comment
[1] ADR confidentiality is distinctly different from lawyer-client
confidentiality, which is defeated when adverse parties reveal information to each other or in the presence of a third party. The extent of ADR
confidentiality protections can be determined by contract, court rules,
statutes, or other professional norms or rules. This Rule addresses the
confidentiality responsibilities of the lawyer neutral and delineates the
neutral’s duties to the parties, the process, and the public.100
[2] Principles of confidentiality are given effect in the laws of evidence (which govern evidentiary uses, restrictions and privileges) and in
ethics rules (which establish professional ethical obligations). Privileges
apply in judicial and other proceedings in which the lawyer neutral may
be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence regarding an ADR process. The rule of confidentiality in professional ethics applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from
the lawyer neutral through compulsion of law. This Rule is intended to
provide the ADR neutral and parties with confidentiality protections for
ADR processes where privacy of the process and unguarded, candid
communications are central to their use and effectiveness.
[3] Since there is no attorney-client relationship between parties and
lawyer neutrals, and because most disclosures of information in most
forms of ADR occur in the presence of the other party, the confidentiality
protection guaranteed to clients by their representational lawyers by
Model Rule 1.6 (as well as the evidentiary privilege of attorney-client)
does not apply in most ADR settings.
[4] The general rule that lawyers may divulge confidences to facilitate law practice within the firm is not applicable in ADR confidentiality,
especially mediation. “Since the essence of mediation is the preservation
of confidential communications, most lawyer-mediators are scrupulous
not to disclose such confidential information to anyone, even attorneys
in their own firm. Mediators may discuss fact patterns or mediation issues with other mediators within the firm or the community of mediators. As a matter of routine, most mediators will screen such comments
to ensure that they never reveal names or confidential information.”101
[5] This Rule imposes an ethical duty of confidentiality on the ADR
neutral to protect the ADR process and the parties. The rule’s confiden-

100. See Poly Software Int’l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Utah 1995); Cho v. S u perior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (1995); Symposium, Confidentiality in Mediation, DISP .
R ESOL. MAG., Winter 1999.
101. James E. McGuire, Conflicts in Subsequent Representation, DISP . R ESOL. M AG.,
Spring 1996, at 4.
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tiality standards can be altered by agreement of all parties or applicable
law.
Many jurisdictions and courts provide confidentiality protections to
parties and ADR neutrals as a matter of law. While some statutes are
narrowly evidentiary in nature and govern only the use of information in
a court proceeding, other mediation confidentiality provisions include
both evidentiary restrictions and broader prohibitions against disclosure.102 Additionally, confidentiality is often provided by contract among
parties and neutrals in private forums.103
[6] Since ADR confidentiality can be governed by different and
sometimes conflicting sources of law and ethical duties, it is important
that the parties and the neutral understand the extent and uncertainties
of the ADR confidentiality protections. Accordingly, section (1) requires
the third party neutral to discuss the applicable co nfidentiality rules with
the parties and counsel at the beginning of the process.
Statutory or common law privileges, evidence codes, protective orders issued by courts under discovery or other statutes, as well as party
contracts and court rules all can affect the scope of confidentiality for the
parties, the third party neutral and others outside of the particular matter.104 Some states, for example, require mediators to disclose certain
information, like the occurrence of child abuse or domestic violence.105
Additionally this Rule, like the ABA’s Ethics 2000 Commission’s proposed revision of Model Rule 1.6 and the forthcoming Restatement of
the Law Governing Lawyers, section 117, permits disclosure of information to prevent imminent bodily harm or substantial financial loss.
See Comment [10] below.
[7] In addition to advising the parties about the scope of confidentiality protections under law and applicable agreement, section (1) also
requires the neutral to discuss and obtain party consent r egarding the
nature of ex parte communications, if any, contemplated by the process.
In some mediation processes, for example, parties meet separately with
the mediator and share information confidentially. In arbitration processes, ex-parte communications with partisan arbitrators may be permitted under certain rules and prohibited under others.106

102. See NANCY R OGERS & C RAIG MCEWEN, M EDIATION: L AW, P OLICY AND P RACTICE (2d ed.
1994) (noting that state legislatures have enacted over 200 mediation statutes); ELIZABETH
P LAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE F EDERAL DISTRICT COURTS : A
SOURCEBOOK FOR J UDGES AND LAWYERS (1996) (noting that federal district courts provide for
confidentiality of ADR processes by local rule or court orders).
103. See, e.g., MODEL ADR P ROCEDURES AND P RACTICES: M EDIATION P ROCEDURE para. 9
(CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution 1998) (containing confidentiality provision); MODEL ADR
P ROCEDURE AND P RACTICES: C ONFIDENTIALITY (CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution 1998).
104. See R OGERS & MCEWEN , supra note 102.
105. See, e.g., CAL. P ENAL CODE § 11164 (1993).
106. See, e.g., AAA/ABA CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES
Canon VII.C(2) (1977) (permitting ex-parte communications between the non-neutral arbitrator and the party who appointed them); CPR R ULES FOR NON -ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION Rule
9.3 (1998) (prohibiting ex-parte communications with neutral or party-appointed arbitrators).
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[8] Given the extensive use in mediation of separate, ex parte meetings or caucuses with the mediator, parties and their lawyers may reveal
information in caucus that is not to be disclosed to the other party without permission. Section (2) establishes that the neutral shall maintain
the confidentiality of all information disclosed to the third party in confidence, unless the party agrees or specifies otherwise. In effect, all information revealed in confidence in ex-parte sessions or through other
confidential means, is to be considered confidential, absent a specific
statement or agreement by the party otherwise.
[9] Section (3) prohibits the neutral from using any information acquired in the ADR proceeding to the disadvantage of any party, subject
to the exceptions stated in the rule. This formulation tracks the current
Model Rule 1.9(c)(1) for conflicts of interest for representational attorneys and former clients. Particularly in mediation or other ADR fora
where ex parte sessions are used, the third party neutral may hear information or settlement facts that may not be legally relevant but are
highly sensitive or proprietary. Under this rule, the lawyer neutral is
prohibited from using this information in subsequent neutral or representational work to the disadvantage of the former ADR party.
[10] Like the ABA’s Ethics 2000 Commission’s proposed version of
Model Rule 1.6 and the forthcoming Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers, section 117, this rule permits disclosure by the neutral third
party of information to prevent death or serious bodily harm to anyone
on the basis of any information learned, and discl osure to prevent substantial financial loss from occurring in the matter at hand, as a result of
a crime or fraud one of the parties has committed or intends to commit.
Several states, notably New Jersey and Florida, require (not just permit)
lawyers to reveal information to prevent death or serious bodily harm, as
well as to avoid some criminal acts or fraud on the tribunal, even when
learned in an otherwise confidentially-protected situation. 107
In many jurisdictions, third party neutrals are already under an obligation to reveal such information under separate statutes or case law.108
R ULE 4.5.3 IMPARTIALITY
(a) A lawyer who serves as a third party neutral should be impartial
with respect to the issues and the parties in the matter.
(1) A lawyer who serves as a third party neutral should conduct
all proceedings in an impartial, unbiased and evenhanded manner,
treating all parties with fairness and respect. If at any time the lawyer is
unable to conduct the process in an impartial manner, the lawyer shall
withdraw, unless prohibited from doing so by applicable law.
107. See, e.g., N.J. RULES OF P ROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998).
108. See, e.g., CAL. P ENAL CODE § 11164 (1992) (requiring child abuse to be reported);
I DAHO R ULES OF EVID . 507(4) (1998) (stating that child abuse discovered during mediation is
not a protected confidence); Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 449-50
(1976) (placing an affirmative duty on psychologist to inform patient’s intended victim of da n ger).
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(2) A lawyer serving in a third party neutral capacity should not
allow other matters to interfere with the lawyer’s impartiality.
(3) When serving in an adjudicative capacity, the lawyer shall
decide all matters fairly, with impartiality, exercising independent judgment and without any improper outside influence.
(b) A lawyer who serves as a third party neutral should:
(1) Disclose to the parties all circumstances, reasonably known to
the lawyer, why the lawyer might not be perceived to be impartial. These
circumstances include (I) any financial or personal interest in the outcome; (II) any existing or past financial, business, professional, family or
social relationship with any of the parties, including, but not limited to,
any prior representation of any of the parties, their counsel and wi tnesses, or service as an ADR neutral for any of the parties; (III) any
other source of bias or prejudice concerning a person or institution
which is likely to affect impartiality or which might reasonably create an
appearance of partiality or bias; and (IV) any other disclosures required
of the lawyer by law or contract.
(2) Conduct a reasonable inquiry and effort to determine if any
interests or biases described in section (b)(1) exist, and maintain a continuing obligation to disclose any such interests or potential biases which
may arise during the proceedings.
(3) Decline to participate as a third party neutral unless all parties choose to retain the neutral, following all such disclosures, unless
contract or applicable law requires participation. If, however, the lawyer
believes that the matters disclosed would inhibit the lawyer’s impartiality, the lawyer should decline to proceed.
(c) All disclosures under section (b) extend to those of the lawyer,
members of his or her family, his or her current employer, partners or
business associates.
(d) After accepting appointment and while serving as a neutral, a
lawyer shall not enter into any financial, business, professional, family or
social relationship or acquire any financial or personal interest which is
likely to affect impartiality or which might reasonably create the appearance of partiality or bias, without disclosure and consent of all parties.
Comment
Impartiality
[1] Impartiality means freedom from favoritism or bias either by
word or action, and a commitment to serve the process and all parties
equally. Section (a) codifies established concepts of neutrality and neutral conduct.
Disclosure
[2] Understanding that absolute neutrality is unobtainable even u nder the best circumstances, this rule establishes a broad and continuing
standard of disclosure by lawyer neutrals with the possibility of waiver
by the parties. The rule describes the circumstances which should be dis-

180

FL O R ID A S T AT E U N I V E RSI T Y LA W RE V IE W

[Vol. 27:153

closed in determining whether the neutral third party is without impermissible partiality and bias to serve in the particular matter. This form of
disclosure is accepted practice in ADR proceedings, including both arbitration and mediation.
A lawyer, as prospective neutral, should err on the side of disclosure
because it is better that the relationship or other matter be disclosed at
the outset when the parties are free to reject the prospective neutral or to
accept the person with knowledge of the relationship.109 While there is
often disagreement over what may reasonably constitute a potential
conflict, the growing acceptance of the principle of disclosure acts as
some reassurance that potentially disadvantaged parties will be given an
opportunity to object or at least investigate further.110 Conversely, it allows all parties to select a neutral after full disclosure, where the parties
knowingly decide to go forward.
[3] Where possible, best practices suggest that the disclosures
should be in writing, as should any subsequent waivers or consents.
While the ABA’s Ethics 2000 Commission revision of Model Rule 1.7
currently requires written disclosures of all representational conflicts
and waivers, this section advises, but does not require, the preparation
of written disclosures and consents.111
[4] What constitutes reasonable inquiry and effort by the lawyer
neutral to uncover interests or relationships requiring disclosure d epends on the circumstances. Typically, in matters where the parties are
represented, this will involve the prospective lawyer neutral obtaining
from the parties a complete identification of the parties, their representatives, insurers, lawyers, witnesses and attendees at the ADR proceeding and submitting the list to the prospective neutral’s conflicts system.112
We note that there may be a tension under the law between the duty to
disclose prior matters, clients, financial holdings, etc., and the confidentiality required to be maintained with respect to ongoing or concluded
representations and ADR proceedings.
The rule defines the scope of required disclosure to include imm ediate family members, and business partners and associates as defined in
Model Rule 1.8 (i).113 It also follows Rule 1.10 and The Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers, section 203, for definitions of business associations and law firm associations.114 The rule does not follow the Judicial Code of Conduct Canon 3(E)(1)(d).

109. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968)
(White, J., concurring).
110. See Christopher Honeyman, Patterns of Bias in Mediation, 1985 MO. J. OF DISP .
R ESOL. 141 (1985).
111. Cf. Calif. Arbitration Statute, CAL. CIV. P ROC . CODE § 1281.9(a) (Deering 1998) (recording the California Arbitration Statute and requiring all conflict disclosures in writing).
112. See Al-Harbi v. Citibank, 85 F.3d 680, 681-83 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
113. The ABA’s Ethics 2000 Commission is currently considering changes to this Model
Rule of Professional Conduct.
114. The proposed Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers was ratified by the American Law Institute in May 1999.
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[5] Where a lawyer neutral volunteers to act as a neutral at the request of a court, public agency or other group for a de minimis period
and pro bono publico, section (b)(2) recognizes that there may not be
opportunity for full inquiry, disclosure or disqualification challenge. In
such circumstances, a third party neutral may have to proceed with the
minimal inquiry and disclosure that may be reasonable under the circumstances. If the lawyer, from memory, recognizes an interest or relationship relevant to the case, the lawyer should identify that interest or
relationship. Otherwise, the lawyer should disclose the general nature of
the lawyer neutral’s practice and affiliations with law firms or other associations, or other known disqualifying circumstances.115
[6] In general, parties may elect to retain a lawyer as neutral after
the latter’s disclosure of reasons why the lawyer reasonably might be
perceived not to be neutral. However, section (b)(3) imposes on the lawyer neutral the obligation to decline to serve if the lawyer-neutral believes that the matters disclosed, or other circumstances, would inhibit
the lawyer’s impartiality or otherwise impugn the integrity of the process. In such instances, the lawyer neutral should decline to serve even if
the parties consent to the lawyer’s retention as a neutral.
[7] Section (d) tracks language from the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, currently under revision, and is intended
to prevent partiality from developing through the acquisition of future
business during the pendency of an ADR proceeding. The parties may
consent to waive this provision. The consent provision may prevent difficulties for third party neutrals engaged to mediate or arbitrate a number
of disputes with the same party, either through contractual appointment
pre-dispute or through multiple, simultaneous appointments or appointments during the pendency of a particular case.
R ULE 4.5.4 CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
(a) Disqualification of Individual Third Party Neutrals
(1) A lawyer who is serving as a third party neutral shall not,
during the course of an ADR proceeding, seek to establish any financial,
business, representational, neutral or personal relationship with or acquire an interest in, any party, entity or counsel who is involved in the
matter in which the lawyer is participating as a neutral, unless all parties
consent after full disclosure.
(2) A lawyer who has served as a third party neutral shall not
subsequently represent any party to the ADR proceeding (in which the
third party neutral served as neutral) in the same or a substa ntially related matter, unless all parties consent after full disclosure.
(3) A lawyer who has served as a third party neutral shall not
subsequently represent a party adverse to a former ADR party where the

115. See infra proposed Rule 4.5.4(b).
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lawyer neutral has acquired information protected by confidentiality under this Rule, without the consent of the former ADR party.
(4) Where t he circumstances might reasonably create the appearance that the neutral had been influenced in the ADR process by the
anticipation or expectation of a subsequent relationship or interest, a
lawyer who has served as a third party neutral shall not subsequently acquire an interest in, or represent, a party to the ADR proceeding in a
substantially unrelated matter for a period of one year or other reasonable period of time under the circumstances, unless all parties consent
after full disclosure.
(b) Imputation of Conflicts to Affiliated Lawyers and Removing Im putation
(1) If a lawyer is disqualified by section (a), no lawyer who is affiliated with that lawyer may knowingly undertake or continue representation in any substantially related or unrelated matter unless the personally disqualified lawyer is adequately screened from any participation
in the matter, is apportioned no fee from the matter and timely and adequate notice of the screening has been provided to all affected parties
and tribunals, provided that no material confidential information about
any of the parties to the ADR proceeding has been communicated by the
personally disqualified lawyer to the affiliated lawyer or that lawyer’s
firm.
(c) A lawyer selected as a partisan arbitrator of a party in a multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party, nor are any affiliated lawyers.
(d) If a lawyer serves as a neutral at the request of a court, public
agency or other group for a de minimis period and pro bono publico, the
firm with which the lawyer is associated is not subject to imputation under section (b).
Comment
Conflicts
[1] ADR conflicts policy, like all conflicts regulation, has two main
objectives: to protect the parties from actual harm suffered by conflicts
of interest, and to protect the process, the public, and the parties from
the “appearance” of improper influences. In the ADR context, it is essential that conflicts rules protect against both actual harm and the appearance of self-interest.
Modern law practice is increasingly characterized by lawyer mobility,
both externally where lawyers move among law firms and organizations,
and internally where lawyers on a case-by-case basis move from representative to neutral roles within their law firms and through association
with other private or public organizations (such as court or bar volunteer
ADR programs). This Rule strives to protect against both actual harm
from lawyer role changes,116 and to protect the ADR processes, the lawyer
116. See Poly Software Int’l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Utah 1995). The court
disqualified a lawyer-mediator from representing a litigant in a subsequent matter related to an
earlier case in which the mediator had received confidences from the parties. See id.; see also

1999]

NON-ADVERSARIAL LAWYERING

183

neutrals, the parties and the public against the corrosive but less tangible
“appearance of impropriety” or “public” harms which threaten the integrity of these processes, the neutrality of the lawyer neutrals, and the
public’s confidence in these dispute resolution procedures.117
[2] Section (a)(1) governs conflicts that may arise during the
pendency of an ADR process and is intended to be a bar against using
the ADR process to obtain additional employment or other benefit. Conflicts arising under this section can be consented to by all parties after
full disclosure.
[3] Section (a)(2) prohibits future representational roles by lawyer
neutrals in the same or substantially related matters, absent disclosure
and consent by all parties. This section codifies the rule established in
Poly Software: “Where a mediator has received confidential information
in the course of a mediation, that mediator should not thereafter represent anyone in connection with the same or a substantially factually related matter unless all parties to the mediation consent after disclosure.”
Poly Software, 880 F. Supp. at 1495. We believe that the logic behind
Poly Software ’s prohibition of future representational relationships in
the same or substantially related cases also applies to adjudicative processes such as arbitration. Accordingly, under this Rule, a neutral arbitrator is subject to the same restrictions as a mediator, although a partisan arbitrator is excepted from these restrictions by section (c).
[4] Conflicts may exist when lawyer neutrals, who have facilitated
disputes and learned confidential and proprietary information about the
disputing parties, are asked to represent a party adverse to a former
ADR party. When trying to facilitate solutions, third party neutrals may
learn significant “settlement facts”—proprietary information about entities or individuals learned within the neutral se tting that may not be legally relevant but that affect the possibility of settlement.118 In this situation, the conflicts issue is whether an ADR neutral who learned facts
(e.g., about financial solvency, human relations, product development,
acquisitions or entity future plans) during the ADR would or could use
those facts against the former ADR party in the subsequent representation. Section (a)(3) addresses this situation by prohibiting a lawyer neutral from representing a party adverse to a former ADR party where the
lawyer neutral has acquired settlement facts or other information pro-

Cho v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 863-64 (1995). The court di squalified the law firm
as counsel after the firm hired the retired judge who had previously presided over the action
and had participated in settlement conferences with the parties. See id. The court also rejected
the use of Rule 1.12 for screening of a former judge or arbitrator.
117. See Cho, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 863. Although the firm had established a screening process to
shield the former judge from the case, and the judge stated that he had no recall of the settlement conferences, the court stated that “no one could have confidence in the in tegrity of a legal
process” where the former judge who received ex-parte revelations from one of the parties joins
the opposing counsel’s law firm.
118. See Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement, supra note 1.
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tected by this rule’s confidentiality provision, Rule 4.5.2, absent consent
by the former ADR party.
[5] Section (a)(4) addresses potential future representational or
other relationships between the lawyer neutral and a party to the prior
ADR in unrelated cases. The bar often refers to these relationships as
“downstream conflicts.” This section is designed to protect against the
appearance or the actuality that an expectation of a beneficial future relationship or interest has influenced the neutral’s conduct in the preceding ADR process. The language in this section is derived from Canon
I.D. of the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes (AAAABA, 1997) (currently under revision).119
Imputation and Screening
[6] This rule follows the trend of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers to provide for screening of lawyer neutrals di squalified
under section (a) in unrelated or substantially related matters. This formulation continues to impute disqualification to the whole firm for the
same matter.120 This rule is premised, in part, on the different confidentiality obligations of third party neutrals and lawyer representatives.
Unlike lawyers representing clients, lawyer neutrals generally should not
share information with other lawyers in their firm, and thus are particularly well suited for screening. See Comment [4] to Rule 4.5.2, Confidentiality.
An alternative formulation, which the Drafting Committee rejected,
would apply the current non-screen, imputation formulation of Model
Rule 1.10. This rule would read: “Unless all affected parties consent after
disclosure, in any matter where a lawyer would be disqualified under
section (a), the restrictions imposed therein also restrict all other lawyers who are affiliated with that lawyer under Rule 1.10.” We believe that
a no-screen imputation rule is contrary to the trend in the law, as noted
above, and would inappropriately limit the growth of mixed neutral and
representational roles for lawyers, with its attendant benefits to both the
practice and the public.
[7] Screening in the ADR context involves the same actions as
screening in other contexts.121 In addition, under the proposed Rule, no119. This Rule provides for a presumptive one-year period of disqualification, but also provides flexibility to shorten or lengthen the disqualification period, as circumstances require.
Although the Model Rules of Professional Conduct prefer general and not time-based rules, the
Drafting Committee and consulting member Professor Geoffrey Hazard believe that a pr esumptive one-year safe-harbor period is preferable to a general rule of reason ableness, given
the substantial need among lawyers and law firms for a clearly defined rule. Understanding that
the time-based rule will not be appropriate in all circumstances, a rule of reasonableness is also
included.
120. See Cho v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (1995) (screening not
sufficient to defeat law firm’s disqualification when the judge who heard the action and presided over confidential, ex parte settlement conferences joined the opposing party’s law firm).
121. See, e.g., MODEL R ULES Rule 1.11(a)(1) (permitting the law firm of a former govern ment lawyer to undertake or continue representation in a matter in which the former gover n -
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tice of the screening must be provided to all affected parties and tribunals.
[8] Section (c) excepts partisan, party-appointed arbitrators from
the restrictions on future representational work under section (a), and
from imputation and screening under section (b). We note, however, the
lack of consensus regarding the role and practices of partisan arbitrators,
and suggest that if “partisan” arbitrators become more like neutral arbitrators, section (c) will have to be amended.
[9] Section (d) excepts lawyer neutrals and their affiliated lawyers
from the imputation and screening rule when the lawyer neutral volunteers his or her services at the request of a court, other public agency, or
institution and serves for a de minimis period.

ment lawyer participated personally and substantially if the lawyer is screened from further
participation in it, including receipt of fees from it). Annotated Model Rule 1.11 states: “An effective screen commonly includes the following factors: (1) the disqualified lawyer does not
participate in the matter, (2) the disqualified lawyer does not discuss the matter with any member of the firm, (3) the disqualified lawyer represents through sworn testimony that he or she
had not imparted any co n fidential information to the firm, (4) the disqualified lawyer does not
have access to any files or documents relating to the matter; and (5) the disqualified lawyer
does not share in any of the fees from the matter.” See ABA ANNOTATED MODEL R ULES OF
P ROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 186 (3d ed. 1996).
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R ULE 4.5.5 FEES
(a) Before or within a reasonable time after being retained as a third
party neutral, a lawyer should communicate to the parties, in writing,
the basis or rate and allocation of the fee for service, unless the third
party neutral is serving in a no-fee or pro bono capacity.
(b) A third party neutral who withdraws from a case should return
any unearned fee to the parties.
(c) A third party neutral who charges a fee dependent on the settlement or other specific resolution of the matter should explain to the parties that such an arrangement gives the third party neutral a direct financial interest in settlement that may conflict with the parties’ possible
interest in terminating the proceedings without reaching settlement. The
third party neutral should consider whether such a fee arrangement creates an appearance or actuality of partiality, inconsistent with the requirements of Rule 4.5.3.
Comment
[1] This rule requires a written communication specifying the basis,
rate and allocation of fees to all parties, unless the third party neutral is
serving in a no-fee or pro bono capacity.
[2] It has become relatively common to use contingent fee or bonus
compensation schemes to provide an incentive to participate in ADR or
to reward the achievement of an effective settlement. Section (3) of the
rule does not prohibit contingent fees (which some jurisdictions or provider organizations do) but requires the third party neutral to explain
what the effects of such a fee arrangement may be, including conflicts of
interest. This rule imposes two obligations on the neutral. The lawyer
neutral is required to assess the possible conflicts attendant to use of
contingent fees and whether the appearance or actuality of partiality
prohibits its use under Rule 4.5.3, Impartiality. If use of the compensation arrangements is not prohibited under that standard, the neutral is
required to disclose the possible consequences of this fee arrangement to
the parties. Contingent fees have not been totally prohibited by this rule
because of their use in creating incentives for some parties to participate
in mediation or other settlement activities.
R ULE 4.5.6 FAIRNESS AND INTEGRITY OF THE P ROCESS
(a) The lawyer serving as third party neutral should make reasonable
efforts to determine that the ADR proceedings utilized are explained to
the parties and their counsel, and that the parties knowingly consent to
the process being used and the neutral selected (unless applicable law or
contract requires use of a particular process or third party neutral).
(b) The third party neutral should not engage in any process or procedure not consented to by the parties (unless required by applicable law
or contract).
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(c) The third party neutral should use all reasonable efforts to conduct the process with fairness to all parties. The third party neutral
should be especially diligent that parties who are not represented have
adequate opportunities to be heard and involved in any ADR procee dings.
(d) The third party neutral should make reasonable efforts to pr event
misconduct that would invalidate any settlement. The third party neutral
should also make reasonable efforts to determine that the parties have
reached agreement of their own volition and knowingly consent to any
settlement.
Comment
[1] While ethical rules cannot guarantee the specific procedures or
fairness of a process, this rule is intended to require third party neutrals
to be attentive to the basic values and goals informing fair dispute resolution. These values include party autonomy; party choice of process (to
the extent permitted by law or contract); party choice of and consent to
the choice of the third party neutral (to the extent permitted by law or
contract); and fairness of the conduct of the process itself. This Rule is
concerned not only with specific harms to particular participating parties but with the appearance of the integrity of the process to the public
and other possible users of these processes.122
[2] This section requires third party neutrals to make reasonable
efforts to determine that the parties have reached an agreement of their
own volition, one that is not coerced. While some have suggested that
third party neutrals should bear some moral accountabi lity or legal responsibility for the agreements they help facil itate,123 these Rules do not
make the third party neutral the guarantor of a fair or just result.
122. The proposed Rule articulates a preferred rule of party choice and autonomy, about
the type of process (including whether mediation is facilitative or evaluative), whether cau cuses
are to be used or not, and the selection of the neutral. This may not be possible in situations
where processes are mandated, either by contract (adhesion or freely negotiated) or by court
rules and requirements. The questions implicated in the fairness and integrity of the process
are very controversial at the present time (including legal cha llenges to compulsory arbitration
clauses in some contracts) and thus, we (or the appropriate ABA ethics body) might conclude
that such a matter is too “substantive” or too unsettled for rule-making at this time.
As we write this, the ca se law is rapidly changing. The U. S. Supreme Court r ecently held that
an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement must clearly and un mistakably state
that federal anti-discrimination claims are subject to arbitration. See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has refused to enforce arb itration in several employment cases where the plaintiffs did not knowingly agree to arbitrate
statutory discrimination claims. See Duffield v. Richard son Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th
Cir. 1998); see also Renteria v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 113 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1997); Nelson
v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1997).
The California Supreme Court also raised serious questions about the fairness and en forc eability of Kaiser’s contractual mandatory medical malpractice arbitration. See Engalla v. Kaiser
Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (1997). Engalla has lead to a comprehen sive assessment and restructuring of the Kaiser arbitration process by outside experts. See THE
BLUE R IBBON ADVISORY P ANEL ON KAISER P ERMANENTE ARBITRATION, T HE KAISER P ERMANENTE
ARBITRATION SYSTEM: A REVIEW AND R ECOMMENDATIONS FOR I MPROVEMENT (January 5, 1998).
123. See Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 9
VT . L. R EV. 1 (1981). The Kutak Commission rejected an earlier effort to prevent lawyers from
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[3] This section of the Rule is designed to prevent harm not only to
parties engaged in dispute resolution processes, but to the appearances
presented to the general public of how legal processes are conducted.
Although this section of the Rule may suffer from the same complaints
about vagueness as the former Canon 9 “appearance of impropriety” did
under the old structure of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the drafters believe that where lawyers “switch” sides and roles, from
partisan to neutral, it is important to provide for basic criteria of fairness
to be monitored in the process for the acceptability and legitimacy of the
process and the lawyers within it.

facilitating negotiated agreements that would be held unconscionable as a matter of law. See
MODEL R ULES proposed Rule 4.3 (draft version 1980).

